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1. Introduction 
 
 
Political settlements are defined by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) as “the forging of a common understanding, usually 
between political elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served through 
acquiescence to a framework for administering political power”. An inclusive 
political settlement is one where the relations between the state and society, 
‘the social contract’, are robust and legitimate.  
 
The idea that a political settlement refers to a ‘common understanding 
between elites’ downplays the extent to which political settlements are 
bargaining outcomes among contending elites. The most theoretically robust 
definition of political settlements has emerged from historical political 
economy, particularly articulated in the work of Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2000), 
where ‘political settlement’  refers to the balance or distribution of power 
between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is 
based.  Looking at the political settlement focuses attention on intra-elite 
contention and bargaining (political versus economic elites; landed and non-
landed elites, regional elites, rural and urban, religious and secular, etc), on 
contention and bargaining between elites and non-elites (either within groups 
or across them, as between classes), inter-group contention and bargaining 
(gender, regional, ethnic/linguistic, religious) and on contention and 
bargaining between those who occupy the state and society more widely.1 
 
Political settlements manifest themselves in the structure of property rights 
and entitlements, which give some social actors more distributional 
advantages than others, and in the regulatory structure of the state. These 
settlements, which can take the form of ‘political coalitions’,  may be the result 
of a narrow or forced bargain imposed by authoritarian regimes, the outcome 
of compromises between previously warring parties, or the result of more 
pluralist bargaining arrangements, as in democratic regimes. In the long line 
of thinking in historical political economy, beginning with Marx, analysing the 
balance of power between contending groups and classes has been central in 
exploring the formation and change of institutions such as the process of 
democratisation (Moore, 1966), the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
(Brenner, 1976), the effectiveness with which industrial policy is implemented 
(Khan, 1995; Kohli, 2004), and the closely related effort of historical 
institutionalists to explain the varied routes to capitalist transformation (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Historical sociologists have also deployed the concept in 
a similar way, for instance Melling’s (1991) analysis of industrial capitalism 
and social insurance in Britain, where he argues that “the social policies of the 
state formed part of a wider political settlement at key moments of 
development”, stressing the limits of analyses that focus only on economic 
and state structures. 
 
Political settlements are shaped by political organisation and these can have a 
decisive impact on both the consolidation of a settlement – its achievement of 
                                            
1
 For a definition of ‘elites’, see the discussion of the ‘elite bargain’ below. 
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resilience – and the extent to which a settlement promotes development-
enhancing actions. Historically, political parties have been the most effective 
types of political organisation as they can develop an ideology and a strategy, 
but most importantly a disciplined organisation to pursue purposeful action.2 
They act as a bridge between civil society and the state and can offer 
ideological justifications for state action and organise societal demands on the 
state. We review evidence from the literature on the role that political parties 
play in shaping political settlements and outcomes in the discussion of 
taxation below. 
 
Determining how inclusive or exclusionary a political settlement is cannot be 
understood simply by looking at the extent of participation in the bargaining 
process, or at appointments in the offices of the state. It requires an analysis 
of the distribution of rights and entitlements across groups and classes in 
society on which the settlement is based. It is possible that an imposed 
political settlement can be more inclusive than one reached through pluralist 
bargaining (as might be argued in the case of South Korea under Park Chung 
Hee versus the post-independence settlement under Syngman Rhee). As 
society is formed of contending groups and classes with different interests, the 
ultimate test of inclusiveness needs to be anchored in the distribution of rights 
and entitlements, which are the outcome of the settlement. Neither is 
inclusiveness necessarily an attribute more likely to lead to development or 
even pro-poor social policy (as we discuss below).  
 
This idea of political settlement as a balance of power that represents a 
bargaining outcome has important implications for the idea of the ‘social 
contract’. While neoclassical theory uses the Hobbesian contract to describe 
the state, such an externally enforced cooperative agreement is not 
democracy.  Instead, the state is itself an (albeit imperfect) agent of coalitions 
formed to assure compliance – ‘a pact of domination’ (Przeworski, 1991: 23). 
As such, a democratic state is neither autonomous nor a social contract, but a 
bargaining equilibrium or relation amongst relevant political forces. 
Przeworski, in fact, argues that the notion that democracy is a social contract 
is logically inconsistent: “Contracts are observed only because they are 
exogenously enforced; democracy, by definition, is a system in which no one 
stands above the will of the contending parties”.  
 
                                            
2
 The classic and still authoritative study of political parties is Duverger (1959, p.425) who 
sees them as oligarchic, hierarchical organisations, capable of forming an “elite sprung from 
the people”. There is some evidence that the degree of political party centralisation seems to 
be an important feature of relatively successful pro-poor social service delivery in low-income 
settings. Sri Lanka, and the state of Kerala in India, for instance, have education indicators 
that are greater than would be expected for their per capita income (Drèze and Sen 1989: 
226-253). Each of these countries/states also posses relatively centralised political party 
structures that effectively aggregate the ‘voice’ of the less wealthy segments of the population 
(see also Moore and Putzel [1999] on the importance of the political capacity of the poor to 
mobilise voice and demand pro-poor social delivery). The Communist countries (Cuba, China, 
the Soviet Union) also all had very disciplined and centralised party structures, and one of the 
sources of legitimacy in such regimes was to provide high quality education and health for all. 
In this sense, the source of state legitimacy and the ideology of the dominant political parties 
may be a more important factor for delivering high quality public services than whether the 
regime is more or less democratic. 
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There are less theoretically interesting uses of the term ‘political settlement’, 
which are ubiquitous in academic, policy and more popular literature. Most 
prominently, in peace studies and international relations and related 
discussions of conflict in the policy and journalist communities, ‘political 
settlement’ refers to two basic phenomena.3 First, it refers to a resolution 
reached after warfare, through negotiation rather than violence – one form of 
settlement mentioned above.4 Second, it is used to refer to any agreement 
between contending parties that is peaceful rather than violent. In fact, while 
historical political economists are applying the concept within a long tradition 
of studying power relations, the concept does not have a specific ‘pedigree’ in 
political theory or political science,5 though it has been deployed by liberal 
political theorists.6  
 
Understanding the condition of a state by examining the political settlement on 
which it rests is helpful for several reasons. First, one of the most important 
insights emerging from the literature is that the ‘design of institutions’ (the 
rules and norms that govern behaviour), particularly formal state institutions, 
does not determine either political or economic outcomes. Democratic 
institutions in one state may be associated with violent conflict and economic 
stagnation, while in another they may be related to peaceful social relations 
and economic growth. The argument emerging from the literature is that it is 
the underlying political settlement which determines political and 
developmental outcomes. We explore this in the next section, in our 
discussion of the way authors examining political settlements from the 
perspective of historical political economy offer a more robust explanation of 
institutional change and development than new institutional economics on 
which much of the policy community’s thinking about good governance rests.  
 
Second, understanding the political settlement provides a route to 
understanding the differential performance of states in the developing world 
and the directions reform might take when it comes to fundamental state 
functions. We illustrate this through a discussion of the literature on taxation. 
The strong performance of Costa Rica or South Africa in raising taxes and 
deploying revenue for developmental purposes, as well as pursuing taxation 
reform can be traced to the different character of the political settlements in 
these countries.  
 
Third, through an examination of the emergent literature on ‘elite bargains’, we 
suggest that a focus on the bargains which can be found at the centre of 
                                            
3
 Whaites (2008) is the first serious effort to introduce the policy community to the concept as 
it is deployed in historical political economy. 
4
 The literature employing this use of the term is voluminous as can be seen through a review 
of Journal of Peace Studies, Journal of Peace Building and Development, Conflict, Security 
and Development, International Negotiation, etc. Lloyd (2001) provides an example. 
5
 A search in Political Science Abstracts between 1960 and 2009 identifies only 27 articles 
that have employed the term “political settlement” in their titles and these were 
overwhelmingly related to the commonplace use of the term in peace studies. 
6
 Ronald Dworkin (2006, 97) sees political settlements as fixing “the distribution of personal 
wealth and opportunity in the community” and as embodied in laws and policies. The political 
settlement sets both the parameters and consequences of choice and as such is foundational 
to the political system. 
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political settlements, provides an explanatory framework for understanding 
trajectories of state fragility and resilience, as well as how these relate to 
processes of development and poverty reduction. An elite bargain may be 
durable (or robust) allowing the state to achieve a significant monopoly over 
coercive force and a basic capacity for taxation and popular allegiance, but in 
doing so it may block further developmental advances (Putzel and 
Lindemann, forthcoming).  
 
We deal with each of these in turn and offer two illustrations of the application 
of the study of political settlements in an appendix at the end. The concluding 
section offers some brief reflections on how a focus on political settlements 
may be important for the development policy community. 
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2. Political Settlements and Institutions 
 
 
While those working within new institutional economics (NIE) conceptualise 
state institutions simply as incentive structures, an historical political economy 
approach argues that institutions incorporate distributional advantages in line 
with the reigning political settlement. In neoclassical theory, institutions and 
property rights emerge because they provide incentives for efficient resource 
allocation. If institutions were simply a set of incentive structures, then it would 
be possible for an appropriate institutional design to improve the growth 
prospects of a failing economy. The idea that rights specify only incentives is 
however incomplete. This is because property rights also, by definition, 
specify a historically specific distribution of control and authority over assets 
(Dahlman 1980, 213-214). Without an analysis of the nature of the polity, it is 
impossible to know, a priori, the legitimacy or enforcement costs of a given 
structure of property rights. Very high enforcement costs imply political 
resistance to a particular institutional framework, and are likely to worsen the 
security of property rights associated with that particular institution. This, in 
turn, is likely to lower the growth rate of the economy. 
 
In the NIE tradition, North (1990) argues that democracy is the institutional 
structure most likely to reduce the transaction costs in a polity.7  The model 
introduces the idea of political transaction costs, which are the costs of 
organizing side-payments (grants or subsidies to interest groups to win their 
support), which allow institutions to be changed through voluntary contracting. 
Democracy is the set of institutional arrangements that supposedly lowers 
political transaction costs the most. Low transaction costs imply easier and 
expanded access to the political system and an increase in the ability of 
agents to bargain over changes that affect their welfare. 
 
According to North: 
 
“The efficiency of the political market is the key to the issue.  If political 
transaction costs are low, and the political actors have accurate models 
to guide them, then efficient models will emerge.” (p.52) 
 
North, in effect, argues that the polity is a set of political institutions that 
generate incentives for change.  It is implicit in the argument that liberal 
economic markets and a liberal and democratic state promote growth-
enhancing incentives.  This is the main idea behind the current “good 
governance” paradigm (see World Bank, 1997). 
 
North (1990, chapters 9-12) applies the model of path dependency to the 
divergent development paths of England/North America and Spain/Latin 
America.  The basic differences are: 
                                            
7
 In NIE, transaction costs “are the costs of finding out what the relevant prices are, of 
negotiating and of concluding contracts, and then of monitoring and enforcing them”, which 
were not taken into account in traditional neoclassical economics  (Harriss et al, .1995, p.3) 
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 a) Spain/L. America — centralized/authoritarian rule  →  monopolisation 
of markets  →  arbitrary rule  →  fiscal instability and state appropriation  
→  insecure property rights  →  relative economic stagnation 
 
b) England/N. America — decentralized, democratic, liberal state  →  
competitive market  →  stable and predictable fiscal policies  →  secure 
property rights  →  economic growth. 
 
North focuses on the incentive role of institutions.  This, however, is 
incomplete, since institutions and rights also assign privileges and therefore 
distributional advantages.  If institutions, such as democracy, only determined 
incentives, then all democracies would be similarly wealthy.  This is not the 
case (see Clague et al., 1997). 
 
There is nothing intrinsically efficient about a particular institution.   This is why 
institutions are not easily transferable from one context to another (the classic 
transferability problem in development). Thus, while North argues that liberal 
democracies and decentralised economic structures were conducive to 
growth in North America and England in the 19th century, developmental state 
theorists such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) argue that centralised 
authoritarian regimes in Korea and Taiwan enhanced the prospects of 
technology acquisition and the coordination of investments in the context of 
late development.  
 
The incentives of an institution can be growth-enhancing if the institution is 
politically legitimate and does not incur high political instability or even war. 
Khan (1995) provides a useful critique of the idea that institutions are simply 
incentive structures.  The comparison of the experience of industrial policy in 
the 1960’s between Korea and Pakistan is illustrative of the point that 
endogenising politics is necessary to explain the outcomes of similar 
institutions.  The main point of the article is that the Pakistani state in the 
1960’s confronted a set of political demands that made very selective and 
exclusionary subsidisation of industry unfeasible.  The political settlements 
underlying a similar strategy in Korea were more compatible with such a 
strategy. 
 
The difference between the NIE and a political economy analysis of 
institutional performance can be seen in Table 1, where the latter gives central 
importance to political settlements. Since institutions assign distributional 
advantages, it is important to identify who benefits from a particular rights 
structure and who is able to block potentially growth-enhancing changes. 
Khan (1995) argues that the ability of powerful groups to block changes 
should be considered as ‘transition costs’ (Khan, 1995).   One challenge for 
political economy analysis is to examine why transition costs are higher in 
some countries. An understanding of the nature of political settlements and 
the political coalitions underlying state power are crucial in this regard.  
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 Source: Khan, 1995: 78. 
 
The relevance of political economy analyses of the political settlement for 
modern debates on governance is that institutional reform is not simply a 
technical issue, but one that needs to make conflict and politics a central part 
of the debate on reform (see Knight, 1992 for a modern treatment of the 
distributive struggle as a primary force in institutional change). 
Table 1: Explaining Institutional Performance 
New Institutional Economics Political Economy Analysis 
Differences in institutional 
performance across countries 
                       ↓ 
Attributed to differences in 
institutional structure across countries 
                       ↓ 
Theories of transaction costs 
associated with particular institutions 
Differences in institutional performance 
across countries 
                       ↓ 
Identification of different political 
settlements 
                        ↓ 
 
Theories relating political settlements to 
net social benefits of particular institutions 
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3. Political Settlements and their Influence on Tax 
Capacity 
 
 
Political settlements determine patterns of resource mobilisation that lie at the 
heart of economic development. Among various means of resource 
mobilisation (forced savings, inflation gains, manipulation of terms of trade, 
etc.), tax is the most closely related to questions of state formation and 
capability. Douglass North, for instance, defines the state in terms of taxation 
powers:  
 
“… an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending 
over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power 
to tax constituents” (North 1981: 21).  
 
Long before that Edmund Burke remarked: "Revenue is the chief 
preoccupation of the state. Nay more it is the state."8 Tax also provides one of 
the principal lenses in measuring state capacity and analysing power and 
political settlements in a society. As Schumpeter notes, “the fiscal history of a 
people is above all an essential part of its general history” (quoted in Levi, 
1988: 6). 
 
A comparison between the experiences of Guatemala and Costa Rica 
demonstrates how the shape of political settlements influences state 
performance in taxation.9 In the 1950s and 1960s, both countries shared a 
number of similar characteristics; they were similar in terms of regional 
location, size, position in the world economy, levels of economic development, 
colonial history, and both relied heavily on coffee exports for long periods. 
Both countries had long-standing powerful elites from colonial times until the 
1950s. In the case of Guatemala landed elites wielded the greatest power, 
while in Costa Rica, financial and merchant elites were traditionally stronger. 
In both cases, these elites had a long record of resisting moves towards 
democratisation. 
 
In the post-1948 period, the Costa Rican polity achieved a successful 
consolidation of democracy and has been characterised by political stability 
and relatively rapid economic growth.  In addition, both tax collection as a 
percentage of GDP has risen to over 20 percent of GDP and income tax 
collection has risen to four percent of GDP, both from very low levels in the 
1960s. The tax take in Costa Rica was the highest in Central America by 
2005. The political, economic and fiscal trajectory of Guatemala in the same 
period, however, was very different. In particular, rates of economic growth 
were much slower, a transition to democracy was absent as the country 
maintained a military authoritarian regime through the latter half of the 
twentieth century, and violent political conflict was pervasive with more than 
                                            
8
 Quoted in O’Brien (2001: 25). 
9
 This comparison is based on Yashar (1997). 
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100,000 people (largely poor rural workers) killed by a repressive military 
government in the1970s and 1980’s.  
 
What appears to be central to the different trajectories of the two countries 
was the formation of political parties in Costa Rica that transformed the 
parameters of the political settlement underpinning the state. The Partido 
Social Démocratica (PSD) gained electoral supremacy and political power 
through a concerted effort to gain political control of the countryside, which 
severely weakened the landlord elite.  As the governing party of a 
revolutionary junta, the PSD further weakened much of the oligarchic elite in 
the country by nationalising the banking system and dismantling the national 
army, which had traditionally been an important ally of the economic elites. At 
the same time they did not rule alone but a minority party, the Partido Unión 
Nacional (PDN), participated and was committed to democratic transition.  
 
The challenge of the two parties to oligarchic rule opened a ‘window of 
opportunity’ for political and economic reform. This challenge, underpinned by 
mobilising poor rural farmers and the urban middle class, divided urban and 
rural elites seeking to establish different party affiliations in an attempt to hold 
on to power. The PSD took advantage of the division within elites to usurp 
control over state resources. With their electoral power secured in the 
countryside, the PSD based its legitimacy on introducing significant 
redistributive reforms that included land reform and the construction of an 
inclusive welfare state, which would deliver substantial social benefits to both 
the rural and urban poor, though the urban middle classes benefited 
substantially as well. To finance the growing welfare state, substantial 
increases in the tax take and in income taxes were implemented and have 
continued to this day, where the degree of progressive taxes and the provision 
of social welfare far outpace Costa Rica’s Central American neighbours. 
 
In Guatemala, in the 1940s and 1950s, the military regime faced popular 
revolts in which democracy and social reforms were demanded. However, 
unlike in Costa Rica, this did not lead to a division of elites or a transition to 
democracy, but rather to a coup within the military and a long-term ban on 
unions and political parties. No party equivalent to the PSD in Costa Rica 
emerged in Guatemala capable of dividing and defeating oligarchic power. 
This was first because the economic elite was less diversified in Guatemala, 
where large landowners (with a greater share of the land than in Guatemala) 
dominated and financial and merchant groups were weaker. The landed elite 
did not develop political parties, which might have led them to develop a wider 
social base that could offset the power of the military. The military itself 
appropriated some large estates establishing a link with the landowners, who 
continued a long tradition of labour coercion that was supported by the 
military. As is well known in works on democracy, military-landlord alliances 
do not bode well for the prospects of democracy (Moore, 1966; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).  As in Costa Rica, the state did penetrate the 
countryside effectively, but in Guatemala this rural penetration was achieved 
through coercive means and was meant to protect the coercive labour 
practices of landowners. Such brutal repression largely caused grievances 
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and resulted in organised rural insurgencies and large-scale civil war in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 
The resultant tax base of the state remained very low. One of the main 
reasons for this was that the wealthiest groups in the economy, the 
landowners, were part of a political settlement that was not interested in social 
welfare provision but in maintaining a status quo of privileges. Because the 
military became large landowners themselves, the prospects of taxing (let 
alone progressively) the main economic actors were much reduced. 
 
The main lessons:  
 
1) The nature of the political settlement is central to understanding not only 
political regime trajectories but also the prospects of welfare and tax reforms. 
 
2) A political settlement based on a landowner-military alliance is unlikely to 
generate tax reforms. In Costa Rica, it was no accident that the government 
achieved higher rates of total tax collection and income tax collection than in 
Guatemala. This was because landowners were not the main support base of 
the government. 
 
3) Regime changes and transitions present ‘windows of opportunity’ to 
institute fiscal and welfare reforms. These transitions are likely to involve a 
transformation of the basis of the political settlement, allowing cross-class 
political alliance-building. Organised popular sectors are thus able to exact 
democratic changes in exchange for their political support. Different factions 
of the elite are likely to divide in the face of organised political challenges. 
 
4) The organisational expression of a political settlement is crucial to 
outcomes. The extent to which political parties can penetrate the countryside 
is central to the prospect of pro-poor, welfare and tax reforms. Land reforms 
can often facilitate increased state capacity to develop land taxes. There are 
parallels with East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, where 
land reform was central to consolidating the political control of the countryside 
and to the development of land taxation. 
 
The political settlement underpinning the state is crucial to trajectories of state 
performance. Developing the capacity of the state to increase taxation is 
centrally determined by the balance of power, or political settlement, on which 
the state rests. This is sharply illustrated in other cases as well. The 
development of a strong fiscal capacity in South Africa was directly related to 
the nature of the political settlement, which was based on a racist cross-class 
alliance, which depended on a strong state to maintain white privilege. Upper 
class whites were willing to pay taxes to the state and a racially defined 
project allowed lower income whites to demand progressive taxation by 
drawing on the shared identity of a cross-class white project (Lieberman, 
2003).  
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4. Political Settlements and State Resilience: the role of elite 
bargains 
 
 
Political science has long been concerned with the problem of what types of 
political arrangements, or in our terms political settlements, generate basic 
political order and stability. This issue concerned Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes 
and others.  More recent examinations of the issue have argued that, at low 
levels of development, the general nature of political settlements that are likely 
to generate political order are far from inclusionary.  
 
North et al. (2007) argue that models of state-building make two assumptions 
that lead to misunderstanding with respect to how and why polities form.  The 
first is that the state is modelled as a single actor. Insights from the discussion 
of political settlements make clear that the state rather is founded on a 
historically determined balance of power between contending interests. The 
second mistake is the assumption that the state has a monopoly on violence.  
Well known examples include Olson’s (1993) stationary bandit model, and 
North (1981) and Levi’s (1988) revenue-maximising monarch, as well as 
standard theories of rent-seeking (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980).  
Following the insights of Thomas Hobbes, North et al (2007) argue that a 
more realistic place to begin is to assume that the potential for violence is 
prevalent throughout society rather than being concentrated.  That is, it is 
necessary to explain rather than assume that the state has a monopoly on 
violence.  The establishment of political order and peace in the model requires 
the creation of incentives for groups to compete for resources through non-
violent mechanisms – that is, to reach a political settlement. 
 
The principal solution through history to the classic Hobbesian problem of 
endemic violence is the creation of what North et al (2007) call limited access 
orders (as opposed to the much rarer, open access orders, which characterise 
advanced market economies).  The limited access order creates limits on the 
access to valuable political and economic functions as a way to generate 
rents.  The dominant coalition within a political settlement creates 
opportunities and order by limiting the access to valuable resources (land, 
labour, and capital) or access and control of valuable activities (such as 
contract enforcement, property rights enforcement, trade, worship, and 
education) to elite groups.  When powerful individuals and groups become 
privileged insiders and thus possess rents relative to those individuals and 
groups excluded (and since violence threatens or reduces those rents), the 
existence of rents makes it in the interest of the ‘privileged insiders’ to 
cooperate with the coalition in power rather than to fight.  In effect, limited 
access orders create a credible commitment among elites that they will not 
fight each other.  This is the basis for a stable ‘elite bargain’. 
 
The shape of the elite bargain on which a political settlement rests is central to 
understanding differential trajectories of state resilience and development.  
This is not adequately addressed in the North et al (2007) model. One of the 
most important propositions that emerges from analytical country narratives in 
the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) suggests that the character and 
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shape of political organisation has been decisive in determining whether a 
state moves towards resilience or fragility, or indeed, takes measures to foster 
the capacity to promote development 
 
The CSP research proceeds from the proposition that states emerge as 
coalitions of ‘elites’. Elites are defined as: a) those in possession of valued 
assets in agriculture, manufacturing, services (main capitalists); b) those who 
wield substantial power of adjudication over the distribution and allocation of 
property rights (traditional chiefs, landlords, regional political leaders); c) those 
who possess authority to bargain on behalf of rural communities or organised 
religious communities (traditional leaders, religious leaders); d) those who 
lead political party organisations. 
 
The ‘elite bargain’ that underpins the state and is embodied in forms of 
political organisation is essentially about the allocation of rents. This can take 
the form of protecting existing landowners or tribal authorities’ rights over land, 
protecting existing capitalists or creating emerging capitalist groups (with trade 
protection, access to finance, etc.), providing privileged pay and employment 
to unions (which accommodates their demands and therefore increases the 
authority of trade union leaders), or creating a managerial public enterprise 
group (to accommodate political insiders or well connected business leaders). 
 
This approach seeks to understand what makes an elite bargain that 
underpins a political settlement durable and adaptable to challenges over 
time, allowing the state to establish and maintain control over coercive power, 
administrative authority and popular allegiance (e.g., state resilience). First, 
the research suggests, a bargain that is inclusive of the major contending 
elites and protects their shared economic interests has the best chance to 
endure over time – a point illustrated by Wood (2000) in her study of El 
Salvador and South Africa, and by Acemoglu et al (2003) in explaining state 
resilience and developmental capacities in Botswana. When a political 
organisation that controls the state excludes major elite interests or de-links 
political rule from major economic relations with existing elites (as in Uganda 
under Obote or Amin, illustrated by Golooba-Mutebi (2008), or in Ghana as 
illustrated by Acemoglu et al) this creates the conditions for fragility and even 
state collapse. When the political organisation is inclusive, since powerful 
elites have a share in the distribution of rights and entitlements, they are far 
less likely to challenge the authority of the state by exiting the coalition and 
mounting a violent challenge based on the activation of ethnic or regional 
boundaries.  If a section of the elite becomes dissatisfied, the costs of exit 
from the coalition are high. 
 
Second, the organisational underpinning of the executive authority of the state 
is central to understanding state resilience. A political organisation is required 
that ensures that the executive authority maintains an ‘encompassing’ interest 
in providing patronage and protecting property rights in such a way as to 
prevent breakaway and exit tendencies among powerful elites. This, we 
suggest, can be achieved through a variety of forms of political organisation 
within a political settlement: a dominant political party, a pact among two main 
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parties10, an institutionalised alliance of major clans in a country (Putzel, 
1999) and no doubt other organisational forms. What is crucial is whether the 
political organisation that controls the state ensures that the executive, on the 
one hand, has the authority to act decisively (on allocative decisions or the 
wielding of coercive power), but on the other, that the executive authority 
plays by the rules around which the elite bargain has been structured and 
does not turn to predation or the exclusion of important members of the 
bargain, which would threaten the stability of the political settlement. It is also 
likely that the development of national political organisations will coincide with 
the development of cross-ethnic coalitions, which in turn will help prevent the 
development of horizontal inequalities that can contribute to political violence. 
 
On the other hand, to ensure that the executive plays by the rules of the elite 
bargain requires that the political organisation allows for the role of at least 
one ‘third party’ enforcer. In the language of George Tsebelis (2002), the 
political organisation must include veto points that can limit the actions 
undertaken by the executive authority, which might undermine the elite 
bargain. In a single dominant political party, this might be the role of the rank 
and file membership whose loyalty is required for the party to be able to wield 
its power effectively. The role of third party enforcer, however, might be 
played by a pivotal interest group. This can be thought of as a group with 
corporatist links to the state but one that has some capacity to finance its 
existence without recourse to the state (that is, it is not dependent entirely on 
state patronage directly). The trade union movement may have played this 
role in Zambia (Di John, forthcoming (a)) and the cooperative movement in 
Tanzania (Putzel and Lindemann, forthcoming). In other forms of political 
organisation this role may be played by a rising bourgeoisie. 
 
Of course, there are other dimensions of the central role played by the political 
organisation of elite bargains within political settlements in determining 
trajectories of resilience and fragility (or development). These include the 
ideological role of the political organisation in control of the state, both in 
fostering national identity and in broadcasting the state’s presence throughout 
the territory. This may be decisive in terms of developing a state capacity to 
ensure control of coercive power and administrative authority. There are, as 
well, important agency factors that intervene that depend largely on the 
qualities of individual leaders that wield executive authority.  It would be hard 
to imagine an explanation of the trajectory followed in Tanzania without 
                                            
10
 Political pacts are a set of formal and informal agreements between contending political 
actors to diffuse potentially disruptive contestation; they establish a basis for restrained and 
peaceful political competition between major elite camps.  Such pacts generally involve 
power-sharing arrangements in key ministries regardless of who wins elections as well as 
consensus-building around basic economic policies.  Such pacts have been central to 
facilitating transition to and consolidation of democracy in several countries such as 
Venezuela and Colombia in the late 1950s, Spain in the 1970s, and South Africa in 1990s. On 
the role of ‘political pacts’, a particular organisational form of a political settlement, as 
engineered bargains among contending elites that avert see Karl (1986) and Di John 
(forthcoming). On the historical role political pacts have played in transitions to democracy in 
different contexts, see O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) and Higley and Gunther 
(1991). On the role of political pacts in the successful introduction of fiscal reforms (see Di 
John, 2009: 109-111). 
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reference to the particular qualities of Julius Nyerere. Understanding the elite 
bargain that lies at the heart of any political settlement provides a window for 
assessing state fragility and resilience as well as possibilities for reform and 
change.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
The emerging insight that every state is based on an historically specific 
political settlement provides a route into understanding why very similar sets 
of formal institutions, like democratic rules or rules governing macroeconomic 
management or trade liberalisation, or industrial policy, can have extremely 
divergent outcomes. This is the most important contribution of historical 
political economy to debates about state-building and where it provides 
analytical power beyond new institutional economics. The implications of this 
for the world of development policy are extensive.  
 
Incorporating an analysis of political settlements can take the very positive 
work done by DFID and others on understanding the ‘drivers of change’ in 
developing countries a step further (Leftwich, 2007). This lens allows an 
analysis of the contending interests that exist within any state, which constrain 
and facilitate institutional and developmental change. It provides a framework 
to analyse how the state is linked to society and what lies behind the formal 
representation of politics in a state. 
 
The political settlement and the elite bargains from which it emerges are 
central to patterns of state fragility and resilience. The role of political 
organisation within the political settlement is crucial to both the stability of the 
settlement and the direction in which it evolves over time. The elite bargains 
that may lead to the establishment of what might be considered a resilient 
political settlement may also act as a barrier to progressive developmental 
change. 
 
Undertaking an anatomy of political settlements suggests that state-building is 
far from a set of technical formulas, but is a highly political process (Putzel et 
al, 2009). Creating capacity within a state to consolidate and expand taxation 
is fundamentally determined by the shape of the political settlement 
underlying the state. This is true as well for the development of service 
delivery or any other function of the state.  
 
To undertake development assistance programmes without understanding the 
political settlement on which a state rests can lead to unintended 
consequences of all sorts. Not only does the political settlement set the 
constraints for what can and cannot be accomplished with foreign assistance, 
but foreign assistance itself can have an impact on the political settlement. 
This analytical framework provides a window for donors to grasp the politics of 
a place in order to design more effective interventions. 
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Appendix 1: Botswana’s Political Settlement  
 
 
Since the 1960s, Botswana has achieved one of the fastest growth rates 
among less developed countries and has also maintained political stability in 
the process. Elite bargains underpinning the reigning political settlement have 
been central to this outcome. 
 
In the period 1925-2000, mineral revenues from diamonds have comprised 
between 55 and 75 percent of government revenues.11  The main puzzle then 
is to explain why the reliance on ‘unearned income’ has coincided with 
effective governance, political stability, and rapid economic growth, despite 
having one of the more unequal income distributions in the world. 
 
Central to Botswana’s success has been the construction of institutions which 
have protected private property rights and have provided the incentives for 
economic and political elites to construct a legitimate central state. The 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated politics in the post-colonial 
period.  While the BDP has won every election in the post-colonial period, the 
emergence of different factions within the BDP and from opposition forces has 
provided the impetus for the BDP to take measures to become more 
legitimate in the eyes of the electorate. At the heart of BDP legitimacy is its 
inclusive patronage structures which accommodates urban elites and middle-
classes and the main rural elites – chiefs and cattle herders.  
 
How have the particular features of the polity in Botswana contributed to the 
development of institutions of private property? 
 
After independence, cattle owners were the most important economic interest 
group and they were politically influential. Indeed, there were close alliances 
between cattle owners and the dominant political party, the BDP. An often 
heard comment in the country is that “Botswana’s government was largely a 
government of cattlemen”. A substantial amount of infrastructure investment 
favoured cattle ranching regions. Moreover, the fact that the elite was invested 
in the main export sector explains why the marketing board (the BMC) gave 
ranchers a good deal and also why the exchange rate was not generally 
overvalued, which contrasts with many African countries.12  The political elite 
were thus enriched by the development policies adopted from 1966. 
 
In addition, political elites faced constraints. The underlying structure of 
institutions seems to have been important in restricting the range of options, 
(particularly distortionary policies), available to political leadership. Political 
accountability was also enhanced by internal competition within the BDP, 
                                            
11
 This section draws on the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) and Holm 
(2000). 
12
 In countries such as Tanzania and Zambia, governing coalitions in the 1970s and 1980s 
had very little political support base among the most productive farming sectors and, as a 
result, set up agricultural marketing boards which severely reduced production incentives (see 
Bates, 1981, 1995). 
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which was achieved in several ways. First, the policy of organising contests in 
primary elections throughout the country resulted in significant rotation of 
elected officials. Second, the BDP permitted a high degree of press freedom 
which resulted in substantial amounts of criticism of policies and politicians. 
Third, two important factions within the BDP emerged which enhanced both 
accountability and political competition. On the one hand, a faction allied with 
older party cadres supported more statist policies and supported giving civil 
servants in the government a great deal of power over resource allocation. On 
the other hand, a faction that comprised groups in support of policies that 
support, first and foremost, local community projects provided a counterweight 
within the BDP. Finally, the BDP allowed opposition parties to compete for 
and (when successful in elections) take control of local councils, which 
increasingly occurred in urban areas. All of these factors led to 
institutionalised checks on both the government and the one-party dominated 
polity. This helped reduce the degree of anti-developmental corruption that 
can occur when mineral abundance and centralised state-led policies 
predominate. 
 
Third, the arrival of diamonds occurred after the country had developed broad-
based political parties, and efficient economic institutions to protect property 
rights helped avoid destabilising rent-seeking struggles. Due to the generally 
broad and inclusive coalition of the BDP, diamond rents were widely 
distributed in the form of infrastructure and social service delivery, which 
reduced the incentives of elites ‘to rock the boat’ by forming large-scale 
challenges to the state authority. 
 
Finally, presidential decisions have been crucial to maintaining political 
stability. Sereste Khama’s decision to transfer the property rights over subsoil 
diamonds away from his own tribe, the Bangwato, to the government, 
probably avoided greater conflict among tribes over the control of wealth from 
diamond revenues. As well, his decision to reduce the political power of tribal 
chiefs with respect to land allocation just after independence, is also likely to 
have reduced tribal cleavages and conflicts. 
 
Lessons from the Botswana case: 
 
1) Broad-based elite inclusion within a political settlement is central for 
managing mineral rents effectively. 
 
2) The construction of a legitimate, national political party as the 
organisational expression of the political settlement was central to both: (i) 
increasing the bargaining power of the government to maximise the tax 
benefits of mineral abundance; and (ii) organising spending and patronage in 
ways that promoted political stability and economic growth. 
 
3) The promotion of internal political party competition can result in effective 
checks on government policies even in a political settlement where one party 
dominates the state. 
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4) Marketing boards are likely to function more effectively when agricultural 
interests are included in the political settlement and are the main support base 
of a democratically elected government in a mineral-abundant economy. 
 
5) While the political settlement in Bostwana was inclusive of most economic 
elites, it was still exclusionary toward many groups and classes. Income 
distribution is among the most unequal in the world. This underscores that the 
extent of inclusion in the state patronage system can vary substantially across 
groups and classes within a polity. 
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Appendix 2: Political Settlements Underlying Growth 
and Political Stability: the case of Malaysia 
 
 
Malaysia, a mineral-abundant economy in the 1970s and 1980s, has achieved 
one of the fastest growth rates in the world since 1970 and has maintained 
political stability. In order to understand how this was achieved, it is necessary 
to examine the underlying political settlement in the state and the role played 
by political strategy promoted by a dominant political party. In 1969, serious 
outbreaks of violence occurred between Malays (who are the largest ethnic 
group but also generally the poorest) and Chinese (a large minority group who 
were generally wealthier and who controlled most of the big businesses). 
 
The ability of the state to handle this threat of violence depended on the 
political capacity to organise a redistributive fiscal policy. In the first instance, 
this required political organisation. While there has been electoral competition, 
Malaysia is essentially a one-party state. Nevertheless, it is also a polity 
characterised by significant degrees of clientelist and populist pressure to re-
distribute income and assets away from the dominant economic groups 
(comprised mainly of ethnic Chinese), toward the more economically 
marginalised but majority ethnic Malay population. 
 
The political consolidation and restructuring which took place after the riots 
established the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malay party 
in the ruling Barisan national coalition, as the dominant political organisation 
within Malaysia’s political settlement. The effect of this was to consolidate 
potentially competing Malay clientelist groups into a unified structure, and, at 
the same time, it gave the state leaders dominance over Chinese business 
owners. Let us look briefly at the historical origin of this settlement. 
 
Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1957. Independence was 
achieved in a relatively non-violent way through a negotiation with the elite-
dominated UMNO. Under Tunku Abdul Rahman, the UMNO constructed the 
National Alliance with the Malay Chinese Association (which was the main 
source of Alliance campaign financing) and the Malaysian Indian Congress. 
UMNO won an overwhelming majority in parliamentary election in pre-
independence elections. At the time, domestic business was almost entirely in 
the hand of the Chinese (who were well organised politically and 
professionally), and the Malays dominated the political elite. UMNO was able 
to channel and mobilise the large Malay peasantry to support the regime, 
rather than move into radical opposition. 
 
In Malaysia, a centralised pattern of resource flows emerged in response to 
middle class demands, which proved to be compatible with rapid growth, and 
structural transformation of the economy. Paradoxically, the well known ethnic 
divide in Malaysia between its minority Chinese-Malaysian capitalists and the 
majority Malay population allowed this centralised redistribution strategy to 
emerge (Khan 2000, 98-101). The political isolation of the Chinese capitalists 
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in the Malaysian polity meant that the ruling coalition in the state could 
effectively ‘tax’ them for the benefit of emerging intermediate Malay groups.  
 
A consensus emerged among the Malay elite that the economic dominance of 
the Chinese needed to be reversed. The Chinese make up one third of the 
population and thus are not negligible in the electoral political system. 
Nevertheless, the political legitimacy of UMNO was largely based on 
effectively taxing Chinese businesses while, at the same time, providing them 
with opportunities to continue investing in the domestic economy, thus 
creating job opportunities for working class Malays. While the first Prime 
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was a strong advocate of parliamentary 
democracy, the ‘ethnic question’ in Malaysia meant that ethnicity took primacy 
over the democratic principle of universal suffrage. As a result, regime 
legitimacy depended more on effective ‘affirmative action’ programmes and 
asset redistribution toward Malays than in instituting democratic procedures 
and electoral rivalry. 
 
It is also important to highlight why upper income groups, comprised mainly of 
Chinese, were unable to capture the state and resist personal income taxation 
as has been the case in many developing countries.  The reason largely has 
to do with contingent historical factors. The integration of Singapore, Sarawak 
and Sabah in 1963 led to a threat to both Malay dominance and UMNO 
supremacy within the then nascent democracy. The threat to Malay political 
supremacy, once Singapore was incorporated into Malaysia, ignited a sense 
of collective resentment among Malays (Putzel 1995, 246). The tensions that 
ethnic politics generated led to the forced expulsion of Singapore in 1965. 
 
There were several important political economy consequences of the legacy 
of the threat to Malay supremacy. First, the main capitalists (ethnic Chinese) 
in the country lost the political power to legitimately buy off politicians in return 
for monopoly rents. Maintaining privileged positions for Chinese capitalists 
would have undermined the New Economic Policy (described below), the 
cornerstone of UMNO’s legitimacy. Second, increases in collective 
resentment and distrust among the Malays for the Chinese made it more 
difficult for Chinese capitalists to form clientelist arrangements with 
intermediate classes of Malays and the political factions representing them. 
Third, distrust and resentment of the Chinese among the politically dominant 
Malays brought the issue of income and asset distribution to the fore of the 
political agenda (Malaysia has among the most unequal distribution of income 
in South East Asia and an income distribution similar to Venezuela).  Chinese 
privilege was associated with this inequality.  Due to the above factors, it was 
politically much more difficult for wealthy groups (in this case, ethnic Chinese) 
to capture the UMNO, which was the dominant coalition underlying the state. 
 
In any case, collectively, the resources from mineral rents and taxes were 
used to create transfers to Malays in many forms: including government-
funded education programmes, employment in public enterprises, subsidised 
loans from the banking system, and preferential access to business 
opportunities. The growth in the state in the period 1970-1985 is indicative of 
the massive increases in patronage. Not only that, the massive privatisation 
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programme of the mid-1980s and early 1990s was also used as a means to 
transfer resources to a series of Malay political constituents (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997: 75-165). This programme of ‘affirmative action’ proved central to 
the maintenance of political stability. 
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